原创翻译:龙腾网 http://www.ps5588.com 翻译:squart 转载请注明出处



As we afford our hallowed forebears the remembrance they deserve, let’s also try to learn from what transpired here seventy-five years ago, and see what it tells us about America’s future as an Asia-Pacific sea power.

当我们向先烈致敬的时候,也应该从75年前发生的事情里学到些什么,看看这个事件(珍珠港事件),能给作为亚太海洋强国--美国的未来,带来什么启示?

In particular, let’s look at Pearl Harbor through the eyes of the enemy.

特别是,让我们通过过敌人的眼睛,看看珍珠港事件。

Why did Japan do it? Doing nothing is a viable strategic option, and oftentimes a good one. Imperial Japan would have been far better off had it forgone the attack on Pearl Harbor and confined its operations to the Western Pacific. Had Tokyo exercised some forbearance, it may have avoided rousing the “sleeping giant” that Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto reputedly said he feared so much. And even if it did awaken the American giant, it would have avoided filling him with what Yamamoto called a “terrible resolve” to crush Japan. Think about it:

日本为什么这么做?日本什么都不做也是可以的,而且往往会是一个好的选择。如果日本帝国放弃攻击珍珠港,将行动限制在西太平洋地区,日本的境况会好得多。如果东京采取某种克制行为,它可能会避免唤醒“沉睡的巨人”,而日本上将山本曾说过,他非常害怕这个“沉睡的巨人”。即使它真的唤醒了美国巨人,它也会避免让这个巨人充满粉碎日本的“可怕决心”。想一想:

By attacking Oahu, Japan took on a second full-blown war in the Pacific Ocean while waging a massive land war on the continent of Asia. Bear in mind that Japan had already been at war for a decade by the time it attacked Hawaii; the Imperial Japanese Army invaded Manchuria in 1931 and China proper in 1937. This was a mammoth undertaking. When the shooting stopped in 1945, some 1.8 million Japanese troops were left in China, Manchuria and Korea. That illustrates the dimensions of the ground war—a war comparable in scale to the maritime war.

通过进攻瓦胡岛,日本在太平洋发起了第二次全面战争,同时在亚洲大陆发动了大规模的陆地战争。请记住,日本在进攻夏威夷时,已经进行战争十年时间了,1931年,日本帝国军队入侵满洲,1937年入侵中国(关内)本土,这是一个大规模的(战争)。到1945年日本投降时,有约180万日军滞留在中国、(中国东北)满洲地区和朝鲜,这说明了陆地战争的规模,这场战争的规模与海上战争相当。

Japan picked a fight with a foe boasting vastly greater economic and industrial power, and it fired that foe’s resolve to translate economic and industrial resources—potential military power, in other words—into deployable military might on a scale that Japan had little hope of matching. My former chairman George Baer, the author of an award-winning history of the United States Navy, reminds us that our navy’s shipbuilding budget for 1940 alone exceeded a decade’s worth of Imperial Japanese Navy shipbuilding budgets. That shows what Japan was up against.

日本选择了一个拥有强大经济和工业实力的敌人,并激发了敌人将经济和工业资源转化为军事力量的决心,这个规模之大,日本几乎没有希望与之匹敌。我的前任乔治贝尔,美国海军历史奖获得者,他告诉我们,仅1940年,我国海军的造船预算就超过了日本帝国海军十年的造船预算,这表明了日本所面临的挑战。

And after the sleeping giant had started awake, the Japanese leadership failed to walk back its ambitious political and strategic aims. It tried to defend the vast territories it overran in 1941–42—and never really adapted to the new circumstances it had created by poking a slumbering America.

在这个沉睡的巨人苏醒过来之后,日本领导层未能收回其雄心勃勃的政治和战略目标。它试图保卫它在1941到1942年占领的广大领土,却从未真正适应它唤醒沉睡的美国之后新的战略环境。



So Yamamoto was right: Japan had to win quickly or not at all. But he was also wrong: by executing his plan to strike Pearl Harbor, the Imperial Japanese Navy guaranteed there would be no quick win. So, again: if the outcome was predictable, why did they do it? What should they have done?

所以山本是对的:日本必须快速获得胜利,否则根本赢不了!但他也错了:通过攻击珍珠港的计划,是不能保证日本帝国海军很快获胜的。所以,仍然是那个问题:如果结果是可以预测的,他们为什么要这么做?他们应该怎么做?

It’s not enough to second-guess what commanders or statesmen of bygone ages did wrong amid the fury of war. To truly learn from them, we have to envision some alternative course of action that would have yielded better results than the one they took.

要从过去的失败中吸取教训,仅仅猜测过去时代的指挥官或政治家在战争中做错了什么,这是不够的。为了真正地从他们身上学到点东西,我们必须设想一些比他们采取的行动产生更好结果的替代行动方案。

What did Japanese want in the Pacific? To oversimplify, they wanted to partition that ocean between Japan and the United States. The waters, skies and landmasses west of Asia’s “second island chain”—a loose line of islands stretching from northern Japan through Guam down to New Guinea—would become a Japanese preserve.

日本人在太平洋想要什么?简单地说,他们想把这片海洋一分为二:日本的和美国的。亚洲“第二岛链”以西的水域、空域和陆地——一条从日本北部延伸至关岛直至新几内亚的松散岛屿线(以西的区域),将成为日本的保护区。

To accomplish such an ambitious goal, the resource-poor island state desperately needed imports of raw materials—primarily from Southeast Asia. That lent even more momentum to Tokyo’s plans for aggression.

为了实现这样一个雄心勃勃的目标,这个资源匮乏的岛国迫切需要从东南亚获取原材料。这为东京的侵略计划提供了更大的动力。

Now, Japanese strategists had seen the United States as the next likely enemy in the Pacific since shortly after the turn of the century. The Imperial Japanese Navy had eradicated Chinese sea power during a short, sharp war in 1895, then turned around and crushed the Russian Navy in naval battles in 1904 and 1905—putting an end to Russian sea power in the Far East for decades to come.

现在,日本战略家们,已经将美国视为本世纪初以来太平洋地区下一个可能的敌人。日本帝国海军在1895年的一场短暂而激烈的战争中消灭了中国的海上霸权,然后在1904年和1905年的海战中,扭转并粉碎了俄罗斯海军,从而结束了俄罗斯在远东地区长达数十年之久的海上霸权。

That left the United States Navy as the next big thing for Japan’s navy. Japanese strategists set to work determining how to overcome another strong yet faraway foe.

这使得美国海军成为日本海军的下一个目标。日本的战略家们,正研究如何战胜另一个强大而遥远的敌人。



In short, Japan had put itself in an impossible position unless it could keep the U.S. offensive halfhearted. And it could have.A combatant like the United States can boast all the economic and industrial resources in the world, yet remain militarily weak if it lacks the resolve to tap those resources, converting latent into actual military might.

简而言之,除非日本能保持不断向美国进攻的态势,否则它将把自己置于一个不可持续的位置上。一个像美国这样的参战者,它吹嘘自己拥有世界上所有的经济和工业资源,但是如果(美国)缺乏开发这些资源的决心,把潜在的军事力量转化为实际的军事力量,那么它(美国)在军事上仍然是很薄弱的。

Japan, in other words, could weaken America by being less provocative than it was. It could avoid firing Americans’ passion for war, and thus their desire to construct and deploy a vast military machine. Japan probably had to attack U.S. possessions to get its way, but it could have attacked something Japan valued but the American people and their leaders did not: the Philippine Islands. Few back home could find the Philippines on a map. It’s doubtful an assault confined to the Philippines would have stoked the popular fury set loose by the raid on Oahu.

换言之,日本可以通过减少挑衅来削弱美国,它可以避免激发美国人对战争的热情,从而避免他们(美国)建造和部署大型军事机器的愿望。日本可能必须攻击美国的资产才能实现自己(的战略野心),但它本可以攻击那些对日本很重要,但美国及美国领导人不那么重视的东西:菲律宾群岛。很少有人能在地图上找到菲律宾的位置,很难相信一次仅限于菲律宾的袭击,会激起(美国)民众像对袭击珍珠岛那样的愤怒。

Absent the public fury that followed Pearl Harbor, chances are only a modest U.S. counteroffensive would have lumbered across the Pacific.

如果没有珍珠港事件引起的公众愤怒,美国可能只会在太平洋地区发起一场温和的反攻。

Attacking Pearl Harbor stoked popular desire for vengeance. That passion—that terrible resolve—fueled the twin counteroffensives commanded by Adm. Chester Nimitz and Gen. Douglas MacArthur. Tokyo may have had to awaken the sleeping giant to accomplish its goals in the Pacific—but it could have avoided filling him with rage and spite. It could have spared itself an all-out American onslaught.

袭击珍珠港激起了民众复仇的欲望,这种强烈的热情和可怕的决心,助长了尼米兹上将和麦克阿瑟将军指挥的两次反攻。东京可能不得不唤醒沉睡的巨人,以实现其在太平洋的目标,但它本可以避免让他充满愤怒和怨恨,它本可以避免美国的全面进攻。

Japanese war planners had long assumed the U.S. counteroffensive would remain limited in scope. They assumed Japanese forces would evict America from the Philippine Islands, and they assumed, rightly, that the U.S. Pacific Fleet planned to steam to the Philippines’ relief. They also knew the U.S. Pacific Fleet was stronger than their Combined Fleet—and thus had to be cut down to size for Japan’s navy to win.

日本的战争策划者们,早先预测美国的反攻范围会非常有限。他们假设日本军队将美国赶出菲律宾群岛,然后理所当然地,美国太平洋舰队会开赴菲律宾增援。他们也知道,美国太平洋舰队比他们的联合舰队更强大,因此必须缩减(美国太平洋舰队的)规模,日本海军才能获胜。

Thus they embraced a doctrine they called “interceptive operations,” whereby aircraft and submarines stationed in the outer Pacific islands would pepper the U.S. battle fleet with small-scale attacks on its westward voyage. If successful, they would wear down the Americans before they even reached the fighting theater.

因此,他们信奉一种他们称之为“拦截作战”的理论,即驻扎在外太平洋岛屿的飞机和潜艇,在美国战斗舰队向西航行时向其发起小规模攻击。如果成功的话,他们甚至可以在(美国舰队)到达战斗地点之前,就把美国人累垮。

Japan’s navy believed it stood a chance in action against a U.S. fleet enfeebled by attacks from the depths and aloft—and it was right. It is really, really hard to overcome a resolute antagonist on his own home ground, even if that antagonist is outmatched in terms of ships, planes and manpower. The Imperial Japanese Navy might deprive the U.S. Navy of the war-making implements on which it depended, as the strategy of interceptive operations envisioned. Or, in the best case from Tokyo’s standpoint, the price tag of entry into the Western Pacific might soar above the price America was willing to pay.

日本海军认为,它有机会对美国舰队采取行动,美国舰队会因为来自海底下和高空中的攻击,而衰弱,这是正确的。在别人的地盘上,要战胜一个坚定的对手是非常非常困难的,即使这个对手在舰艇、飞机和战斗人员上都比不上他。日本帝国海军,可能会摧毁美国海军所依赖的作战工具,正如拦截作战战略所设想的那样。或者,从东京的角度来看,进入西太平洋的代价可能会高于美国愿意支付的代价。

If so, the United States might do the rational thing. They might shrug at the loss of the Philippines. They might write off the Western Pacific—ceding it to Japan by default. Tokyo would win without hazarding a pitched fleet battle.

如果是这样,美国可能会更加理智,他们可能不会在乎失去菲律宾,他们可能将西太平洋地区扔掉,默认将其割让给日本。而东京将赢得胜利,而不必冒一场激烈的海战风险。

So the Pearl Harbor raid was fatally flawed as strategy. Japanese leaders could have gotten part or all of what they wanted by foregoing the Pearl Harbor attack.

所以,珍珠港的突袭战略,存在着致命缺陷,日本领导人可以在珍珠港袭击事件之前,得到他们想要的部分或全部东西。

And yet they did it anyway. Why?
Part of the reason comes from Japanese leaders’ reading of their own maritime history. Japan struck first—and before it declared war—to open the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05. While the torpedo raid against the Russian fleet at Port Arthur did little permanent physical damage, it did far-reaching psychological damage. From then on, Russian commanders sheltered timidly under the guns of Port Arthur. And when they did venture out, they got pummeled by Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō’s Combined Fleet. Port Arthur made an appealing precedent for Pearl Harbor. A preemptive attack might intimidate American commanders the way it had Russians in 1904.

但他们还是(袭击了珍珠岛),为什么呢?
部分原因来自日本领导人对本国海洋历史的解读。1904-1905年日俄战争,日本在战争爆发前,首先发动了进攻,虽然在旅顺港对俄罗斯舰队的鱼雷袭击,没有对俄罗斯舰队造成根本性的伤害,但心理伤害却很深远。从那时起,俄罗斯指挥官胆怯地躲在旅顺港的炮台之下,当他们冒险出去的时候,他们被日本上将东乡平八郎的联合舰队击溃了。旅顺港的战争,为珍珠港先发制人的袭击提供了一个先例。



The Pearl Harbor attack thus had a come-and-go character that Port Arthur did not. But the Japanese navy could keep up the pressure in 1904 where it could not in 1941.

因此,珍珠港袭击没有旅顺港袭击那样的前后条件,1904年日本海军可以继续施压,而在1941年则不行。

That being the case, Nagumo’s airmen really had to make their shot at the Pacific Fleet count. As Admiral Nimitz noted when he arrived on Oahu to take command of the Pacific Fleet, the Japanese navy blundered egregiously by going after the U.S. battleship fleet instead of other targets. Nimitz believed the Japanese missed an opportunity by striking at the battle fleet but not its logistics. Japanese aviators could have taken out the dry docks that would refit most of the damaged vessels. They could have taken out the fleet’s fuel supply.

因此,南云中一手下的战斗机飞行员们,必须让他们对太平洋舰队的袭击有意义。正如尼米兹上将,在抵达瓦胡岛指挥太平洋舰队时所指出的那样,日本海军追逐着轰炸美国的战列舰,而不是其他目标,这犯了严重的错误。尼米兹认为,日本人错过了一个机会,他们打击的是舰队,而不是后勤。日本飞行员,本可以把船坞给炸掉,船坞可以维修(美国)大部分受损的舰只,他们也本可以切断舰队的燃料供应。

Had Japanese tacticians planned the strike wisely, they would have made infrastructure the main target, then hit the fleet with whatever munitions they had left after clobbering dry docks, fuel storage sites, and other support assets like oilers, ammunition ships, and destroyer, submarine. That would have set back the U.S. counteroffensive considerably, granting the Japanese Empire time to cement its conquests in Asia and the Pacific.

如果日本战术家明智地计划了这次打击,他们将把基础设施作为主要目标,然后用他们摧毁船坞、燃料储存点和其他支援物资(如运油船、弹药船、驱逐舰、潜艇等)后留下的任何弹药轰炸作战舰队,这将大大阻碍美国的反攻,让日本帝国有时间巩固其在亚太地区的征服统治。

After the war, wartime prime minister Hideki Tojo cited the U.S. Navy’s capacity for underway replenishment—and thus its capacity to remain constantly at sea—as a decisive factor in the Pacific War’s outcome. Indeed it was.

战后,战时首相东条英机,曾提到美国海军的海上补给能力,以及美国海军不断出海的能力,是太平洋战争结果的决定性因素。事实确实如此!

Now, some might contend that the United States would have gone to war in the Pacific even had the Pearl Harbor attack never happened. Our allies were under assault, and we were honor bound to keep our commitments. The Japanese armed forces certainly would have attacked the Philippine Islands, which lay astride the sea lanes connecting the Japanese home islands with the “Southern Resource Area” in the South China Sea. The Philippines, of course, had been American territory since 1898. Tokyo could hardly let an American stronghold stand along this maritime thoroughfare remain intact—posing a constant threat to Japan’s economic lifelines. Nor could Washington overlook an attack on American soil.

现在,有些人可能会说,即使珍珠港事件从未发生,美国也会在太平洋上与日本开战。我们的盟友受到攻击,我们有义务履行我们的承诺。日本军队当然会攻击菲律宾群岛,这些岛屿处在连接日本本土和南中国海“南部资源区”的海上通道上。而菲律宾,自1898年以来,一直是美国的领土,东京很难让美国在这条海上要道上保持完整的存在,对日本的经济命脉构成持续的威胁,华盛顿也不能忽视对美国领土的袭击。

And there’s no gainsaying this. But think about two things. One, popular sentiment in the United States may not have demanded offensive action in the Pacific following an attack on the Philippines. It certainly wouldn’t have demanded action as loudly as it did following December 7.

这是无可否认的。但想想两件事,其一:在菲律宾遭到袭击后,美国的民众情绪可能不会要求在太平洋采取进攻行动,当然不会像12月7日(珍珠港遭袭)之后那样大张旗鼓。

After all, the Pacific War was not the only show in town. The United States, an offshoot of the British Empire, had always faced eastward across the Atlantic. The war against Hitler’s Germany may have had first claim absent a Pearl Harbor attack—and the Pacific War may well have remained a backwater until the Allies’ work in Europe was done. By that time, Japan may have locked in part—or all—of its gains in the Far East. Time would have been on its side.

毕竟,太平洋战争并不是唯一的(战场)。作为大英帝国的一个分支,美国一直跨着大西洋向东(望着欧洲)。在没有珍珠港袭击的情况下,美国可能会首先宣布向希特勒的德国开战,而太平洋战争,可能在盟国结束欧洲的战争前,都不会有动作。而到了那时候,日本可能已经摘取了其在远东的部分或全部收益。时间本来就是站在它这边的。

And, two, even after the U.S. Navy, Marines and Army started their westward march across the Pacific, Japan would have been better-positioned to resist the U.S. offensive if the Japanese armed forces had stuck with their prewar game plan. Rather than the vengeful America that Japan faced by the evening of December 7, it may have faced a relatively halfhearted America, war-weary from fighting in Europe.

还有,第二点,即使在美国海军、海军陆战队和陆军开始向西跨越太平洋向日本进攻之后,如果日本武装部队坚持战前的作战计划,在抵抗美国的进攻时,日本也处于更有利的位置上。相比日本在12月7日晚上面对的复仇的美国,(如果不进攻珍珠港),它可能面对的是一个相对不热心的美国,一个因在欧洲作战而厌倦战争的美国。



And third, let’s not expect prospective foes to be as reckless as Imperial Japan. In 1956, President Dwight Eisenhower reportedly told Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, a diplomat who was forever on the go: “Don’t just do something; stand there!” Sometimes inaction—or less ambitious action—represents the wisest strategy.

第三,不要指望未来的敌人像日本帝国那样鲁莽。根据报道,1956年,美国总统艾森豪威尔对国务卿杜勒斯说:“什么都不要做,就停在那里!”有时候,不采取行动或者消极点的行动,是很明智的战略。

China, unlike Japan, appears content to build up naval and air power along its periphery in hopes of rewriting the rules of the Asian order—the liberal order of seagoing trade and commerce over which America has presided since Japan’s downfall in 1945. While sometimes bellicose and always assertive, Beijing does not appear eager to pick a fight. It doesn’t appear to be in any particular hurry to fulfill its maritime destiny.

与日本不同的是,中国似乎满足于在其周边建立海空力量,希望改写亚洲秩序的规则---自1945年日本垮台以后一直由美国主导的海上自由贸易秩序。虽然北京有时候咄咄逼人,并且非常自信,但它似乎并不急于挑起一场战斗,它似乎并不急于完成自己的海上使命。

In short, this is a rival who seems to have learned from Yamamoto: don’t jab a sleeping giant, and if you do, don’t steel his resolve. Let him slumber until it’s late in the contest, and you may prevail. China may have learned the true lessons of Pearl Harbor.

简单来说,这个对手(中国)似乎从山本身上学到了些东西:不要刺伤一个沉睡的巨人,如果你刺伤了他,也不要让他坚定决心,让他睡到比赛结束,你就可以获胜。中国或许吸取了珍珠港的教训。